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Abstract
We consider general allocation problems with indivisibilities where agents’
preferences possibly exhibit externalities. In such contexts many different core
notions were proposed. One is the γ-core whereby blocking is only allowed via
allocations where the non-blocking agents receive their endowment. We show
that if there exists an allocation rule satisfying individual rationality, efficiency,
and strategy-proofness, then for any problem for which the γ-core is non-empty,
the allocation rule must choose a γ-core allocation and all agents are indifferent
between all allocations in the γ-core. We apply our result to housing markets,
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1 Introduction
In an influential paper, So¨nmez (1999) established an important result for rules sat-
isfying individual rationality, efficiency, and strategy-proofness in various allocation
problems. More precisely he showed that if there exists a rule satisfying these three
properties, then for any problem having a non-empty core, the core must be essen-
tially single-valued (meaning that all agents are indifferent between all allocations
belonging to the core) and the rule must choose a core allocation.
This unifies several well-known results in the allocation literature. In marriage
problems (Gale and Shapley, 1962) it has been shown that no rule satisfies strategy-
proofness and stability (Roth, 1982a) and no rule satisfies individual rationality,
efficiency, and strategy-proofness (Alcalde and Barbera`, 1994). Since in marriage
problems the core is non-empty and not necessarily essentially single-valued, these
results follow from So¨nmez (1999). In housing markets (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) the
core is always single-valued (Roth and Postlewaite, 1977) and the core is the unique
rule satisfying individual rationality, efficiency, and strategy-proofness (Ma, 1994).
Again those two results follow from So¨nmez (1999).1
An important feature of So¨nmez’s result is that it applies to allocation problems
both with externalities and without externalities. Since So¨nmez’s result only holds for
one direction, subsequent literature established if-and-only-if versions of it in certain
contexts. Indeed, already So¨nmez (1999) showed that when the core is essentially
single-valued and externally stable2, the core is weakly coalitionally strategy-proof.3
Related results were established by Ma (1998) in coalition formation models and by
Takamiya (2003). The latter showed in environments where the core is essentially
single-valued for all profiles and agents care only about their own consumption and
have strict preferences, then any selection from the core satisfies strategy-proofness.
1Roth (1982b) has shown strategy-proofness of the core and it is straightforward that the core
satisfies individual rationality and efficiency.
2Any allocation not belonging to the core is weakly dominated by a core element.
3This is a variant of a theorem in Demange (1987).
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Pa´pai (2004) characterizes the coalition formation models having for each profile a
single-valued core and then shows in any such model the core is the only rule satisfying
individual rationality, efficiency, and strategy-proofness. Rodriguez-Alvarez (2009)
shows that this result continues to hold on smaller domains which are minimally rich.
The results in the previous paragraph apply to contexts without externalities. In
reality externalities prevail and it is important to understand the consequences of
them. So¨nmez (1999) did not rule out externalities but his blocking notion is very
strong in those environments. Namely a coalition can block an allocation via another
allocation irrespectively of what is happening to the other agents’ allotments. For
example, a coalition may block via allocations which are not individually rational
and/or where some of the undesired endowments of the blocking coalition are con-
sumed by other agents. Since the (optimistic) core is often empty in environments
with externalities, alternative core notions have been proposed. One is the γ-core
(Hart and Kurz, 1983; Chander and Tulkens, 1997) whereby coalitions can only block
via allocations where each agent not belonging to the coalition receives his endowment
(and such allocations are individually rational for the non-blocking agents). The in-
terpretation is that any allocation is a global agreement and once a coalition deviates
(or forms) all non-deviating agents receive their endowments. The core is always a
subset of the γ-core and the γ-core is more frequently non-empty than the core.
We show that if there exists a rule satisfying individual rationality, efficiency,
and strategy-proofness, then for any problem having a non-empty γ-core, the γ-core
must be essentially single-valued (meaning that all agents are indifferent between all
allocations belonging to the γ-core) and the rule must choose a γ-core allocation.
So¨nmez’s result follows from our result (but not vice versa). In addition, our proof
is extremely short and straightforward. We show the importance of our result by
demonstrating that the γ-core is the “largest” core notion whereby such a result can
be obtained. The “larger” the core, the more powerful a result in the sense of So¨nmez
(1999) becomes.
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The note is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model and the
main result of So¨nmez (1999). In Section 3 we give our main results for essentially
single-valued γ-cores. In Section 4 we apply our results to several environments with
externalities.
2 The Model
A generalized indivisible goods allocation problem, or simply a problem, is a 4-tuple
(N,w,Af , R) where N = {1, . . . , n} is a finite set of agents, w = (w(1), . . . , w(n))
is an initial endowment, Af is a set of feasible allocations, and R = (R1, . . . , Rn)
is a list of preference relations. Each agent i ∈ N is endowed with the (finite) set
of indivisible goods w(i). For all T ⊆ N , let w(T ) = ∪i∈Tw(i). An allocation is a
mapping a : N  w(N) such that for all x ∈ w(N), |a−1(x)| = 1. Then a(i) is the
set of indivisible goods assigned to i. Let A denote the set of all allocations.
We exogenously specify a set Af ⊆ A as the set of feasible allocations. We require
that w ∈ Af . Each agent i is endowed with a set of preference relations Ri. Any
preference relation Ri ∈ Ri is a complete, transitive and reflexive binary relation on
Af . Let Pi denote the strict preference relation and Ii denote the indifference relation
induced by Ri.
Throughout the set Ri is supposed to satisfy the following two conditions.
ASSUMPTION A: For all Ri ∈ Ri and all a ∈ Af , aIiw ⇔ a(i) = w(i).
Thus, an agent is indifferent between an allocation and the initial endowment al-
location if and only if he keeps his initial endowment.
ASSUMPTION B: For all Ri ∈ Ri and all a ∈ Af with aRiw, there exists R˜i ∈ Ri
such that
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1. for all b ∈ Af\{a}, bRia⇔ bR˜ia,
2. for all b ∈ Af\{a}, aRib⇔ aR˜ib, and
3. for all b ∈ Af\{a}, aPib⇔ aP˜ib and aR˜iwR˜ib.
Let R = ×i∈NRi. For all R ∈ R and all T ⊆ N , let RT denote the restriction of
R to T and let R−T denote the restriction of R to N\T . If T = {i}, then we write
R−i instead of R−{i}. Throughout N , w and Af remain fixed and for short a problem
is a profile R ∈ R.
A coalition is a non-empty subset of N . An allocation a ∈ Af weakly dominates
the allocation b ∈ Af via the coalition T under R if (i) a(i) ⊆ w(T ) for all i ∈ T , (ii)
aRib for all i ∈ T , and (iii) aPjb for some j ∈ T . We also write a wdomT b. The core
consists of all undominated allocations. For all R ∈ R, let
C(R) = {b ∈ Af :6 ∃T and a ∈ Af with a wdomT b}.
The core is essentially single-valued if for all R ∈ R and all a, b ∈ C(R), we have aIib
for all i ∈ N .
An allocation rule is a function ϕ : R → Af . Given profile R, let ϕ(R) denote the
allocation chosen by ϕ for profile R. We are interested in the following three proper-
ties: (i) individual rationality : for any profile each agent weakly prefers the chosen
allocation to his endowment; (ii) efficiency : no other feasible allocation Pareto dom-
inates the chosen allocation; (iii) strategy-proofness: reporting the truth is a weakly
dominant strategy.
Individual Rationality: For all R ∈ R and all i ∈ N , ϕ(R)Riw.
Efficiency: For all R ∈ R, there exists no a ∈ Af such that aRiϕ(R) for all i ∈ N
and aPjϕ(R) for some j ∈ N .
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Strategy-Proofness: For all R ∈ R, all i ∈ N , and all R′i ∈ Ri, ϕ(R)Riϕ(R′i, R−i).
The principal result of So¨nmez (1999) relates the existence of rules satisfying the
above three properties with essentially single-valued cores.
Theorem 1 (So¨nmez, 1999) If there exists an allocation rule ϕ : R → Af that is
individually rational, efficient, and strategy-proof, then N , w, Af , R are such that
1. For all R ∈ R, for all a, b ∈ C(R), we have aIib for all i ∈ N ;
2. For all R ∈ R with C(R) 6= ∅, we have ϕ(R) ∈ C(R).
So¨nmez (1999) also established a converse result. For this the core needs to be
externally stable: for any R and any b ∈ Af\C(R), there exists a ∈ C(R) and
∅ 6= T ⊆ N such that a wdomT b.
Weak Coalitional Strategy-Proofness: For all R ∈ R, all T ⊆ N , and all R′T ∈
RT , there exists i ∈ T with ϕ(R)Riϕ(R′T , R−T ).
Proposition 1 (So¨nmez, 1999) Let N , w, Af , R be such that the core correspon-
dence is essentially single-valued and the core of each problem is externally stable.
Then any selection from the core correspondence is weakly coalitionally strategy-proof.
3 The γ-Core
Many papers have shown if-and-only-if versions of the result by So¨nmez (1999) in
environments where agents are selfish and have strict preferences over their own as-
signments, and allocations are “separable”. However, his result allows for externalities
in the sense that an agent might not be indifferent between two allocations where he
receives the same set of objects.
Once externalities enter the environment, there are different notions of the core.
In particular, in the above dominance relation, a dominates b via some coalition T
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under R even if a is not individually rational for the agents outside of T and/or
a(T ) ( w(T ) meaning that some of the undesired endowments of coalition T are
consumed by non-blocking agents under a. Under externalities, the core may be
frequently empty and Theorem 1 does not apply. This is the optimistic notion of the
core.
Our notion below will only allow blocking for coalitions with some allocation where
all other agents receive their endowment. This corresponds to Hart and Kurz (1983)’s
and Chander and Tulken (1997)’s γ-stability of agreements whereby an agreement (or
allocation) is disbanded once a coalition deviates and the others stay put with their
endowment. In the γ-core blocking is only allowed with allocations where the non-
blocking agents receive their endowments. For any R ∈ R, let
Cγ(R) = {b ∈ Af : 6 ∃T and a ∈ Af with a wdomT b and a(i) = w(i) for all i ∈ N\T}.
Obviously, C(R) ⊆ Cγ(R) for any profile R. Assumption A guarantees that for the
γ-core blocking only occurs via allocations which are individually rational for the
non-blocking agents. In addition, the blocking coalition needs to consume all of their
endowments, i.e. a(T ) = w(T ).
Let IR(R) denote the set of feasible allocations which are individually rational
under R.
Theorem 2 If there exists an allocation rule ϕ : R → Af that is individually ratio-
nal, efficient, and strategy-proof, then N , w, Af , R are such that
1. For all R ∈ R, for all a, b ∈ Cγ(R), we have aIib for all i ∈ N ;
2. For all R ∈ R with Cγ(R) 6= ∅, we have ϕ(R) ∈ Cγ(R).
Proof. Let R ∈ R. If Cγ(R) = ∅, then there is nothing to show. Let Cγ(R) 6= ∅.
If 1. or 2. does not hold, then there exists a ∈ Cγ(R) such that not aIiϕ(R) for all
i ∈ N .4 Because both a and ϕ(R) are efficient, there exists i ∈ N with aPiϕ(R). By
individual rationality, ϕ(R)Riw. We distinguish two cases: ϕ(R)Piw or ϕ(R)Iiw.
4If aIiϕ(R) for all i ∈ N , then ϕ(R) ∈ Cγ(R).
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First, let ϕ(R)Piw. Note that aRiw. Let R˜i ∈ Ri be such that
1. for all b ∈ Af\{a}, bRia⇔ bR˜ia,
2. for all b ∈ Af\{a}, aRib⇔ aR˜ib, and
3. for all b ∈ Af\{a}, aPib⇔ aP˜ib and aR˜iwR˜ib.
Now observe that Assumption A and ϕ(R)Piw imply ϕ(R)(i) 6= w(i). Also aPiϕ(R)
implies aP˜iϕ(R) and aR˜iwR˜iϕ(R). Thus, by Assumption A and ϕ(R)(i) 6= w(i), we
have wP˜iϕ(R). Now ϕ(R) /∈ IR(R˜i, R−i) and IR(R˜i, R−i) ( IR(R)5.
By strategy-proofness, ϕ(R)Riϕ(R˜i, R−i). Hence, aPiϕ(R˜i, R−i). Now by 3.,
aP˜iϕ(R˜i, R−i) and aR˜iwR˜iϕ(R˜i, R−i). Now this together with individual rational-
ity and Assumption A implies ϕ(R˜i, R−i)(i) = w(i). Note that a ∈ Cγ(R˜i, R−i) and
again 1. or 2. does not hold for (R˜i, R−i), and IR(R˜i, R−i) ( IR(R).
Second, let ϕ(R)Iiw. By Assumption A, ϕ(R)(i) = w(i). Since a ∈ Cγ(R), we
cannot have that ϕ(R) weakly dominates a via N\{i}. If ϕ(R)Ija for all j ∈ N\{i},
then by aPiϕ(R), a Pareto dominates ϕ(R), a contradiction to efficiency of ϕ. Thus,
there exists j ∈ N\{i} with aPjϕ(R). If ϕ(R)(j) 6= w(j), then by Assumption A,
ϕ(R)Pjw, and we do the same as above. Otherwise, ϕ(R)(j) = w(j) and again
we cannot have that ϕ(R) weakly dominates a via N\{i, j} (noting that ϕ(R)(i) =
w(i) and ϕ(R)(j) = w(j)). If ϕ(R)Iha for all h ∈ N\{i, j}, then by aPiϕ(R) and
ϕ(R)(j) = w(j), a Pareto dominates ϕ(R), a contradiction to efficiency of ϕ. Note
that we cannot have ϕ(R) = w because otherwise a Pareto dominates w and ϕ is not
efficient. Because N is finite, we eventually find l with aPlϕ(R) and ϕ(R)(l) 6= w(l).
Then we do the same construction as above.
Because N and Af are finite and the number of individually rational allocations
becomes smaller at each step, this is a contradiction. 
5For all b ∈ IR(R˜i, R−i), bR˜iw; if wPib, then b 6= a and by Assumption A, b(i) 6= w(i); now aPib
and by construction and Assumption A, wP˜ib, a contradiction to bR˜iw.
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Since C(R) ⊆ Cγ(R) for any profile R, C(R) 6= ∅ implies Cγ(R) 6= ∅ and Theorem
1 follows from Theorem 2. Therefore, for any environment for which Theorem 1 is
conclusive (i.e. for any profile R with C(R) 6= ∅), Theorem 2 is conclusive as well
(i.e. Cγ(R) 6= ∅ and both 1. and 2. must hold for the γ-core and the allocation rule
ϕ (and therefore, 1. and 2. must hold for the core and the allocation rule ϕ)). Of
course, for any profile R where C(R) = ∅ and Cγ(R) 6= ∅, Theorem 1 has no bite
whereas 1. and 2. of Theorem 2 must hold.
Using the proof of Proposition 1, we obtain the following conditional converse of
Theorem 2.
Proposition 2 Let N , w, Af , R be such that the γ-core correspondence is essentially
single-valued and the γ-core of each problem is externally stable. Then any selection
from the γ-core correspondence is weakly coalitionally strategy-proof.
In the following we will argue that the γ-core is the “largest core notion” for which
1. and 2. of Theorem 2 hold in a preference domain free sense.
Given allocation a, we say that coalition T is effective for a if (i) a(i) ⊆ w(T )
for all i ∈ T and (ii) if |T | ≥ 2, then a(i) 6= w(i) for all i ∈ T . Note that for any
profile R, all a, b ∈ Af and all S ⊆ N , if a weakly dominates b via S, then there
exists T ⊆ S which is effective for a and a weakly dominates b via T . For a coalition
to block individually rational allocations, we only need to consider allocations which
are effective for this coalition.
Fixing N , w, and Af , we define for each coalition a set of feasible allocations
via which this coalition can weakly dominate other allocations and for which this
coalition is effective: formally, let
Bf (T ) = {a ∈ Af : T is effective for a}.
Let Bf = (Bf (T ))T⊆N . In general, let B(T ) ⊆ Bf (T ) for all T ⊆ N and B =
(B(T ))T⊆N . Now B records for each coalition T the set of feasible allocations via
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which T can weakly dominate other allocations and for which T is effective. The
B-core is defined as follows: for all R ∈ R, let
CB(R) = {b ∈ Af : 6 ∃T and a ∈ B(T ) with a wdomT b}.
The Bf -core coincides with the core. Setting Bγ(T ) = {a ∈ Bf (T ) : a(i) = w(i) for
all i ∈ N\T} and Bγ = (Bγ(T ))T⊆N , the Bγ-core coincides with the γ-core.
Obviously, for any B such that for all T ⊆ N , Bf (T ) ⊇ B(T ) ⊇ Bγ(T ), we
have for any domain R and any profile R ∈ R, C(R) ⊆ CB(R) ⊆ Cγ(R). Then by
Theorem 2, both 1. and 2. of Theorem 2 must hold for the B-core for any profile
R ∈ R with CB(R) 6= ∅.
We call a domain R solvable if there exists an allocation rule ϕ : R → Af that
is individually rational, efficient, and strategy-proof. Of course, if a domain is not
solvable, then Theorem 2 holds for all B-cores and no comparison with the γ-core is
possible. Indeed, we show that 1. and 2. of Theorem 2 hold for the B-core for any
solvable preference domain if and only if the B-core is contained in the γ-core.
Let PO(R) denote the set of feasible allocations which are efficient under R.
Theorem 3 Fix (N,w,Af ) and B ⊆ Bf . Then the following are equivalent:
(i) For any solvable domain R and any allocation rule ϕ : R → Af that is individ-
ually rational, efficient, and strategy-proof, N , w, Af , R are such that
1. For all R ∈ R, for all a, b ∈ CB(R), we have aIib for all i ∈ N ;
2. For all R ∈ R with CB(R) 6= ∅, we have ϕ(R) ∈ CB(R).
(ii) For any solvable domain R, CB ⊆ Cγ.
Proof. (ii)⇒(i): Let R be a solvable domain. If CB ⊆ Cγ, then by Theorem 2, 1.
and 2. hold for the B-core, i.e. (i) holds.
(i)⇒(ii): In showing the other direction, let R be a solvable domain. Let ϕ : R →
Af be an allocation rule that is individually rational, efficient, and strategy-proof.
10
Suppose that 1. and 2. hold for the B-core but for some R ∈ R, CB(R) 6⊆ Cγ(R).
Then CB(R) 6= ∅ and 1. and 2. hold for CB(R), i.e. ϕ(R) ∈ CB(R).
We show Cγ(R) = ∅. If Cγ(R) 6= ∅, then by 2. of Theorem 2, ϕ(R) ∈ Cγ(R).
Thus, by 1. for the B-core and 1. of Theorem 2, for all a ∈ CB(R) and all b ∈ Cγ(R),
aIib for all i ∈ N . But then CB(R) ⊆ Cγ(R), a contradiction.
Hence, Cγ(R) = ∅. By Assumption A and individual rationality of ϕ, for all
i ∈ N , if ϕ(R)(i) 6= w(i), then ϕ(R)Piw. Let S = {i ∈ N : ϕ(R)(i) 6= w(i)}. If
S = ∅, then ϕ(R) = w and by efficiency of ϕ, w ∈ Cγ(R), a contradiction. Thus,
S 6= ∅. Let R˜ ∈ R be such that (i) for all i ∈ N\S, R˜i = Ri and (ii) for all i ∈ S,
R˜i ∈ Ri is such that
1. for all b ∈ Af\{ϕ(R)}, bRiϕ(R)⇔ bR˜iϕ(R),
2. for all b ∈ Af\{ϕ(R)}, ϕ(R)Rib⇔ ϕ(R)R˜ib, and
3. for all b ∈ Af\{ϕ(R)}, ϕ(R)Pib⇔ ϕ(R)P˜ib and ϕ(R)R˜iwR˜ib.
Note that Assumption B guarantees the existence of R˜. It is straightforward that
ϕ(R) ∈ CB(R˜). Thus, by 1. and 2. for the B-core, ϕ(R˜) ∈ CB(R˜) and for all
i ∈ N , ϕ(R˜)I˜iϕ(R). Since ϕ(R) /∈ Cγ(R), we have for some a˜ ∈ Af and T ⊆ N ,
a˜ wdomT ϕ(R) under R, a˜(i) 6= w(i) for all i ∈ T , and a˜(i) = w(i) for all i ∈ N\T .
By Assumption A, a˜ ∈ IR(R˜). Now by construction of R˜, a˜ wdomT ϕ(R) under R˜.
If Cγ(R˜) 6= ∅, then by 2. of Theorem 2, ϕ(R˜) ∈ Cγ(R˜). Now by ϕ(R)I˜iϕ(R˜) for all
i ∈ N , we then also have ϕ(R) ∈ Cγ(R˜), a contradiction. Thus, Cγ(R˜) = ∅.
Note that a˜ wdomT ϕ(R) under R˜, a˜ wdomT ϕ(R˜) under R˜, and a˜ ∈ IR(R˜).
Without loss of generality, a˜ ∈ (IR∩PO)(R˜): if not, then for some c ∈ (IR∩PO)(R˜),
c wdomN a˜. Let W = {i ∈ N : c(i) 6= w(i)}. Then c wdomW a˜ under R˜ and by
construction, cR˜iϕ(R) for all i ∈ W . Thus, c wdomW ϕ(R˜) under R˜.
For all i ∈ N , let Rˆi be such that
1. for all b ∈ Af , bIˆiw ⇔ b(i) = w(i),
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2. if a˜(i) 6= w(i), then for all b ∈ Af\{ϕ(R˜)}, bIˆia˜⇔ b = a˜,
3. if ϕ(R˜)(i) 6= w(i), then for all b ∈ Af\{a˜}, bIˆiϕ(R˜)⇔ b = ϕ(R˜),
4. a˜Rˆiϕ(R˜)⇔ a˜R˜iϕ(R˜), and
5. for all b ∈ Af , if b(i) 6= w(i), b 6= a˜ and b 6= ϕ(R˜), then wRˆib.
Note that by construction of Rˆ = (Rˆi)i∈N , we have ϕ(R˜) ∈ CB(Rˆ), a˜ ∈ (IR∩PO)(Rˆ),
and a˜ wdomT ϕ(R˜) under Rˆ.
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Given i ∈ N , let Rˆi be defined as follows: Ri ∈ Rˆi ⇔ (i) Ri = Rˆi or (ii) Ri
satisfies Assumption A and there exists a ∈ Af with a(i) 6= w(i) and aRˆiw such that
1. for all b ∈ Af\{a}, bRˆia⇔ bRia,
2. for all b ∈ Af\{a}, aRˆib⇔ aRib, and
3. for all b ∈ Af\{a}, aPˆib⇔ aPib and aRiwRib.
It is easy to check that Rˆi satisfies Assumptions A and B. Let Rˆ = ×i∈NRˆi. We
define ϕˆ on the domain Rˆ as follows: for all R ∈ Rˆ, (i) if a˜ ∈ (IR ∩ PO)(R), then
ϕˆ(R) = a˜, (ii) if a˜ /∈ (IR ∩ PO)(R) and ϕ(R˜) ∈ (IR ∩ PO)(R), then ϕˆ(R) = ϕ(R˜),
and (iii) otherwise, ϕˆ(R) = w. Note that Rˆ ∈ Rˆ, a˜ ∈ (IR ∩ PO)(Rˆ), ϕˆ(Rˆ) = a˜, and
for some i ∈ N , we do not have a˜Iˆiϕ(R˜). Because ϕ(R˜) ∈ CB(Rˆ), now 1. or 2. does
not hold for CB and ϕˆ.
It remains to show that ϕˆ is individually rational, efficient and strategy-proof on
the domain Rˆ (and therefore, Rˆ is solvable). Individual rationality and efficiency are
obvious. In order to demonstrate that ϕˆ is strategy-proof, let R ∈ Rˆ, i ∈ N , and R′i ∈
Rˆi. By contradiction, suppose that ϕˆ(R′i, R−i)Piϕˆ(R). Let ϕˆ(R′i, R−i) = d. Then by
6Note that here it is not possible to define a “one-profile” domain (a` la Takamiya (2003)) whereby
a˜ and w are the only individually rational allocations because for some U ( T we may have a˜ ∈ B(U)
and a˜ weakly dominates w via U (and one could let the rule choose a˜ for this profile without violating
(i)).
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individual rationality of ϕˆ and Assumption A, d(i) 6= w(i). Thus, by construction,
d = a˜ or d = ϕ(R˜).
If d = a˜, then by construction of Rˆ, we must have a˜ ∈ (IR ∩ PO)(R). By
definition, then ϕˆ(R) = a˜, which is a contradiction.
If d = ϕ(R˜), then by construction we must have ϕˆ(R) ∈ {w, a˜}. If ϕˆ(R) = w,
then dPiw and for all j ∈ N , ϕ(R˜)Rjw, which is a contradiction to efficiency of
ϕˆ. If ϕˆ(R) = a˜ and a˜(i) 6= w(i), then by construction of Rˆi, a˜Rid, which is a
contradiction. If ϕˆ(R) = a˜ and a˜(i) = w(i), then a˜ ∈ (IR ∩ PO)(R′i, R−i) and by
definition, ϕˆ(R′i, R−i) = a˜, a contradiction. 
Remark 1 If (i) Af is separable in the following sense: for all a, b ∈ Af and all
T ⊆ N such that a(T ) = w(T ) = b(T ), there exists c ∈ Af such that for all i ∈ T ,
c(i) = a(i), and for all i ∈ N\T , c(i) = b(i) and (ii) preferences are externality-free
(or selfish) (for all R ∈ R, all i ∈ N , and all a, b ∈ Af , if a(i) = b(i), then aIib), then
the core and the γ-core coincide. It is easy to see that both (i) and (ii) are necessary
for the core to coincide with the γ-core, i.e. if (i) or (ii) does not hold, then the core
does not necessarily coincide with the γ-core. In particular, selfish preferences do not
suffice.
4 Applications
4.1 Global Trades
One application are global trades where either all agents receive their endowments or
no agent receives his endowments. Let
Ag = {a ∈ A : a(i) 6= w(i) for all i ∈ N}.
Now note that if Af ⊆ Ag ∪ {w}, then Cγ coincides with the set of individually
rational and efficient allocations.
We obtain the following corollary from our main result.
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Corollary 1 Let Af ⊆ Ag ∪ {w}. There exists an allocation rule ϕ : R → Af that
is individually rational, efficient, and strategy-proof if and only if N , w, Af , R are
such that
1. For all R ∈ R, for all a, b ∈ (IR ∩ PO)(R), we have aIib for all i ∈ N ;
2. For all R ∈ R, we have ϕ(R) ∈ (IR ∩ PO)(R).
Proof. (Only if) This follows directly from Cγ = IR ∩ PO and Theorem 2.
(If) It is easy to see that for any R, (IR∩PO)(R) is externally stable and Propo-
sition 2 yields the desired conclusion. 
Note that Corollary 1 does not follow from Theorem 1 because C 6= IR ∩ PO.
Furthermore, C may often be empty (because coalitions T ( N may block with
allocations a ∈ Af for which a(T ) = T ) and Theorem 1 often does not apply whereas
above Cγ is always non-empty.
Example 1 Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4} and for all i ∈ N , w(i) = i. Let R = {R} and
Af = {w, (2, 1, 3, 4), (2, 1, 4, 3), (1, 2, 4, 3)} and where
R1 R2 R3 R4
(2, 1, 4, 3) (2, 1, 4, 3) (1, 2, 4, 3) (1, 2, 4, 3)
(1, 2, 4, 3), w (1, 2, 4, 3), w (2, 1, 3, 4), w (2, 1, 3, 4), w
(2, 1, 3, 4) (2, 1, 3, 4) (2, 1, 4, 3) (2, 1, 4, 3)
Note that R satisfies Assumptions A and B and that (IR∩PO)(R) = {(1, 2, 4, 3)} =
Cγ(R) and C(R) = ∅. Even though there is a unique individually rational and efficient
allocation the core fails to identify it because (2, 1, 4, 3) wdom{1,2} (1, 2, 4, 3). Of
course, any individually rational and efficient rule must choose this allocation (which
is also the unique γ-core allocation).
14
4.2 Constrained Efficiency
In many environments there does not exist any rule satisfying individual rationality,
efficiency, and strategy-proofness. Then in order to obtain a positive result, one must
weaken one of the properties. One possible route is to require constrained efficiency
instead of (full) efficiency: the chosen allocation should be efficient on the range of
the rule. Below we show that Theorem 2 has implications for such an approach, and
that this allows us to identify “largest” sets of feasible allocations for which we may
obtain a positive result.
Given (N,w,Af ) and any Ri ∈ Ri, for A ⊆ Af with w ∈ A, let Ri|A denote
the restriction of Ri to A
7 Similarly, let Ri|A = {Ri|A : Ri ∈ Ri}. Obviously, if
Ri satisfies Assumptions A and B, then Ri|A satisfies Assumptions A and B. Let
R|A = ×i∈NRi|A.
Let ϕ : R → Af be an allocation rule. Let A(ϕ) = {ϕ(R) : R ∈ R} ∪ {w}.
Constrained Efficiency: For all R ∈ R, there exists no a ∈ A(ϕ) such that aRiϕ(R)
for all i ∈ N and aPjϕ(R) for some j ∈ N .
Note that in the corollary below, in 1. and 2. the γ-core is defined for the
constrained set of allocations A(ϕ).
Corollary 2 If there exists an allocation rule ϕ : R → Af that is individually ra-
tional, constrained efficient, and strategy-proof, then N , w, A(ϕ), R|A(ϕ) are such
that
1. For all R ∈ R, for all a, b ∈ Cγ(R|A(ϕ)), we have aIib for all i ∈ N ;
2. For all R ∈ R with Cγ(R|A(ϕ)) 6= ∅, we have ϕ(R) ∈ Cγ(R|A(ϕ)).
Proof. Given ϕ : R → Af , we define φ : R|A(ϕ) → A(ϕ) as follows: for any
Ri ∈ Ri|A(ϕ) fix some li(Ri) ∈ Ri such that li(Ri)|A(ϕ) = Ri; let l(R) = (li(Ri))i∈N
7For all a, b ∈ A, we have aRi|Ab⇔ aRib.
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and set φ(R) = ϕ(l(R)) for all R ∈ R|A(ϕ). Now for N , w, A(ϕ) and R|A(ϕ) the
rule φ satisfies individual rationality, efficiency (because constrained efficiency of ϕ is
equivalent to efficiency on A(ϕ)), and strategy-proofness. Thus, Theorem 2 applies
and 1. and 2. hold for φ. Note that this is true for any φ constructed in this way,
i.e. for any R ∈ R we may choose the functions li such that li(Ri|A(ϕ)) = Ri (and
φ(R|A(ϕ)) = ϕ(R)). 
Corollary 2 allows us in addition to construct largest sets of feasible allocations
such that there may exist a rule satisfying individual rationality, efficiency, and
strategy-proofness: in situations where for Af there does not exist any such rule,
at the extreme by setting A = {w} there trivially exists a rule satisfying our proper-
ties. Now a set w ∈ A ⊆ Af is a largest set of allocations (for our properties) if there
exists a rule ϕ : R → A (with (A\{w}) ⊆ A(ϕ)) satisfying individual rationality,
constrained efficiency, and strategy-proofness, and for any set A′ ) A there does not
exist a rule ϕ : R → A′ (with (A′\{w}) ⊆ A(ϕ)). Now of course, any such largest
set A must be such that for any R ∈ R, Cγ(R|A) is either essentially single-valued or
empty. Hence, we may look for largest sets of allocations w ∈ A ⊆ Af such that for all
R ∈ R, Cγ(R|A) is either essentially single-valued or empty (and for any set A′ ) A
there exists R ∈ R such that Cγ(R|A′) is multi-valued). Note that this construction
applies to environments with and without externalities.
In the context of coalition formation, Pa´pai (2004) characterizes the coalition
formation models which have a singleton core for any preference profile. Equivalently
she identifies largest sets of coalitions which can be formed such that the core is a
singleton. Pa´pai (2007) answers a similar question in exchange markets with multiple
individual endowments.
Remark 2 So¨nmez (1999) has shown that special cases of his model are (hedonic)
coalition formation and (hedonic) network formation. For both these models, we have
for all i ∈ N , w(i) = {wij : j ∈ N\{i}} where wij is the permit for agent j to join a
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coalition with agent i (or wij is the permit for agent j to form a link with agent i). In
the coalition formation model a feasible allocation is a partition of the set of agents,
i.e.
Afc = {a ∈ A : for all distinct i, j ∈ N,wij ∈ a(j)⇔ wji ∈ a(i),
and for all distinct i, j, k ∈ N,wij ∈ a(j) & wjk ∈ a(k)⇒ wik ∈ a(k)}.
In the network formation model a feasible allocation is a network consisted of a set
of pairwise (undirected) links, i.e.
Afc = {a ∈ A : for all distinct i, j ∈ N,wij ∈ a(j)⇔ wji ∈ a(i)}.
For the coalition formation model, one may consider for any agent all strict rank-
ings over all coalitions to which he belongs to (and preferences over partitions are
selfish). For the network formation model, one may consider for any agent all strict
rankings over all components (which is a set of links) to which he belongs to (and
preferences over networks are selfish). In both of these cases on the full domain
there does not exist an allocation rule satisfying individual rationality, efficiency, and
strategy-proofness. This is not entirely surprising because both coalition formation
and network formation are generalizations of two-sided marriage markets, and if there
would be a rule satisfying individual rationality, efficiency, and strategy-proofness
in these models, then there would exist one satisfying these properties in marriage
markets8 (but the γ-core may be multi-valued in marriage markets). However, in
applications we may use Corollary 2 to restrict preference domains and/or the set of
feasible coalitions/links (or equivalently weaken efficiency to constrained efficiency in
order to obtain a positive result (and this approach allows for externalities)).
4.3 Housing Markets with Indifferences
Using our main result it follows that on the domain where indifferences with the
endowment are excluded, all the rules of Alcalde-Unzu and Molis (2011) and Jaramillo
8Simply take the restriction of this rule to all marriage problems.
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and Manjunath (2012) are core selections (when the core is non-empty) and that the
core is essentially single-valued when non-empty (Wako, 1991; Ma, 1994).
For all i ∈ N , let w(i) = i and A˜ = {a : N → N : a(i) 6= a(j) for all i 6= j}, and let
Ri consist of all weak selfish preference relations on N such that aIiw ⇔ a(i) = w(i)
and for all a, b ∈ A˜, a(i) = b(i)⇒ aIib. Let Pi ⊆ Ri consist of all strict selfish prefer-
ence relations on N such that for all a, b ∈ A˜, a(i) 6= b(i)⇔ not aIib. Both Alcalde-
Unzu and Molis (2011) and Jaramillo and Manjunath (2012) construct “large” fami-
lies of rules satisfying individual rationality, efficiency and strategy-proofness on the
domain R with A˜ being the set of feasible allocations. Therefore, the domain R is
solvable while for some preference profiles the γ-core is empty and those rules may
choose non-equivalent (in terms of welfare) allocations. Now Theorem 2 generalizes
these results from the core to the γ-core and both for any domain in between the
strict and the weak one, and for any subset of A˜ being the set of feasible allocations.
Corollary 3 For all i ∈ N , let Pi ⊆ Di ⊆ Ri satisfy Assumption B, D = ×i∈NDi,
and w ∈ Af ⊆ A˜. Then the following holds:
(i) For any allocation rule ϕ : D → Af satisfying individual rationality, efficiency
and strategy-proofness, we have for all R ∈ D such that Cγ(R) 6= ∅, ϕ(R) ∈
Cγ(R).
(ii) For all R ∈ D and all a, b ∈ Cγ(R), we have aIib for all i ∈ N .
One extreme case of Corollary 3 is the strict domain where A˜ is the set of feasible
allocations, and Corollary 3 together with Proposition 2 corresponds to Ma (1994)’s
result. The other one is the weak domain and A˜ is the set of feasible allocations, and
Corollary 3 generalizes the results of Alcalde-Unzu and Molis (2011) and Jaramillo
and Manjunath (2012). Note that Corollary 3 holds for any domain in between the
strict and the weak domain and/or the set of feasible allocations does not necessarily
satisfy separability (as defined in Remark 1). When A˜ is the set of feasible allocations,
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all these rules are extensions of the top trading cycles algorithm from the strict domain
to the domain D.
Often in one-sided assignment problems we face logistical constraints, as for ex-
ample in kidney exchange (Roth, So¨nmez and U¨nver, 2004) only a certain number
of kidneys can be transplanted, or geographical moving constraints whereby agents
can only move to houses which are not “too far away”. Given 1 ≤ k ≤ |N |, let
Ak = {a ∈ Af : |{i ∈ N : a(i) 6= w(i)}| ≤ k} denote the set of feasible allocations
where at most k agents move. Obviously, Ak is not separable and the core is a sub-
solution of the γ-core. In addition, in kidney exchange externalities prevail because
often “shorter” chains or cycles are preferred to “longer” ones. Another source for
externalities in housing markets may be the fact that an agent does not care only
about which good he consumes but also about the identity of the agent who con-
sumes his/her endowment. In other words agent i’s preference relation on Af ranks
indifferent all allocations a, b ∈ Af such that a(i) = b(i) and a−1(i) = b−1(i).
Below we show that Assumption B is necessary for deriving the conclusion of
Theorem 2. We know from Ma (1994) that on the strict domain for any profile there
exists a unique core allocation which can be derived via the top trading cycles algo-
rithm (TTC), and TTC is the unique allocation rule satisfying individual rationality,
efficiency and strategy-proofness.9 We describe a subdomain of the “strict” house
exchange domain where for any profile there exists a unique core allocation (and the
core is externally stable) but there are allocation rules which are individually rational,
efficient and strategy-proof and do not always choose core allocations.
Example 2 10Let N = {1, 2, 3}, w = (1, 2, 3), and for all i ∈ N , let Pˆi consist of all
strict preferences over N which are single-peaked with respect to the line 1−2−3. For
any Ri, let top(Ri) denote the most preferred object under Ri, i.e. then top(R3) = 1
9In a model with multiple individual endowments Pa´pai (2007) develops a notion of “exchanges
along deals” such that this result carries over to her setting.
10Kasajima (2013) first considered problem of assigning heterogenous indivisible goods with single-
peaked preferences.
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and single-peakedness imply 1P32P33. Obviously ×i∈N Pˆi = Pˆ ⊆ P = ×i∈NPi. We
define ϕ as follows: for any R ∈ Pˆ , (i) if top(R1) = 3, top(R3) = 1, top(R2) = 1, then
ϕ(R) = (3, 1, 2); (ii) if top(R1) = 3, top(R3) = 1, top(R2) = 3, then ϕ(R) = (2, 3, 1);
and (iii) otherwise ϕ(R) = C(R). By single-peakedness, for profiles of type (i) and (ii)
we must have 3P12P11 and 1P32P33. Now it is straightforward that ϕ is individually
rational and efficient. In showing strategy-proofness11 it suffices to consider profiles
R of type (i) or (ii), say R is a profile of type (i). Obviously agents 1 and 2 cannot
manipulate. If agent 3 reports some other R′3 ∈ Pˆ3, then by single-peakedness,
top(R′3) 6= 1. If top(R′3) = 2, then ϕ(R1, R2, R′3) = ϕ(R), and if top(R′3) = 3, then by
individual rationality, ϕ(R1, R2, R
′
3) = 3. In both cases agent 3 does not profitably
manipulate.
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